Papers delivered at the joint meeting of the Hegel Society of America and the Hegel Society of Great Britain held at Merton College, Oxford, Sept. 1-4, 1981, to mark the 150th anniversary of Hegel's death. Includes bibliographical references and index.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition by Robert R. WilliamsLawrence S. StepelevichRobert R. Williams. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. Pp. xviii +433. Cloth, $60.00.The eminent Hegel scholar, Vittorio Hoesle, perceived the major weakness of Hegel’s philosophy in its seeming failure to adequately deal with the issue of interpersonal relations. Hardly a new objection, as Hoesle’s critique has a lineage that reaches at least as (...) far back as Schleiermacher. Against this thesis, Robert Williams had earlier developed a counter-argument which he presented in his work, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (1992). In this foundational work, Williams drew out and clarified Hegel’s concept of recognition from its inchoate source in Fichte; and by so doing defended “Hegel against charges that his thought violates intersubjectivity and difference by reducing the other to the same.”(1) In the present work, the conceptual and textual grounds established by Williams in his first work on the topic allow for a more extensive extrapolation of Hegel’s doctrine, and argues that “The story of recognition is a story about Fichte and Hegel. Fichte introduced the concept but did not make it the basis of either his ethics or his politics. Hegel appropriated and transformed the concept of recognition and regarded it as the fundamental intersubjective structure of ethical life.” (26)After a brief introductory critical survey of some of the more or less misleading contemporary views of both Hegelians and non-Hegelians regarding Hegel’s concept of interpersonal recognition, Williams proceeds to present its historical genesis, of how it emerged from its early and unfocused appearances in the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling. Williams then traces the further development and elaboration of this concept as it gains expression in the course of Hegel’s own ethical theory, not only as it is found in such major works as the Phenomenology of Mind and The Philosophy of Spirit, but also as it appears in his earlier and lesser known Jena Manuscripts of 1805. After this preliminary doctrinal and historical introduction, Williams turns to the most substantial section of his study, that work of Hegel’s in which the concept of recognition would be expected to and does indeed play its most evident ethical role: The Philosophy of Right.Almost every category within The Philosophy of Right is examined not only for the appearance of the concept, but for the defining role which it plays in the construction of that category. Such an examination is necessary for Williams, since “Reciprocal recognition in its various determinate types and instances is the general structure of ethical life and the embodiment of social reason that underlies and supports the concepts of law and state.” (364) Among the categories considered, categories that Williams discusses within the context of contemporary issues and each of which is taken up in a separate chapter of his work, are Family, Crime and Punishment, Poverty, and the State. In every instance considered he argues that an understanding of the defining role of recognition is a necessary prerequisite not only for a clear and correct comprehension [End Page 174] of Hegel’s ethical theory but of all ethical theory. Certainly, after this scholarly tour de force Hegel’s concept of recognition will have to be taken into account in any credible discussion of his ethical theory. In a final chapter Williams turns to some contemporary ethical theorists who have not taken that concept into consideration, or if they have, have either misunderstood or have rejected it. For Williams, such thinkers as Kojeve, Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida and Levinas, in their misunderstanding or rejection of the ethically mediating concept of recognition, have all contributed toward the “disrupted and fragmented cultural situation at the end of the twentieth century.” (412)In sum, Williams’ presentation and support of Hegel’s ethical employment of the concept of intersubjective recognition cannot but encourage theorists to reconsider the subject, and to see in it not only a conceptual tool which can serve to lucidly contextualize Hegel’s ethical theory into the matrix of his total philosophical system, but also as a needed ethical concept able to transcend both... (shrink)

This paper obtains the weak completeness and decidability results for standard systems of modal logic using models built from formulas themselves. This line of work began with Fine (Notre Dame J. Form. Log. 16:229-237, 1975). There are two ways in which our work advances on that paper: First, the definition of our models is mainly based on the relation Kozen and Parikh used in their proof of the completeness of PDL, see (Theor. Comp. Sci. 113-118, 1981). The point is to (...) develop a general model-construction method based on this definition. We do this and thereby obtain the completeness of most of the standard modal systems, and in addition apply the method to some other systems of interest. None of the results use filtration, but in our final section we explore the connection. (shrink)

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 817-827, July 2022.

The Heythrop Journal, Volume 63, Issue 4, Page 817-827, July 2022.

This article enlarges classical syllogistic logic with assertions having to do with comparisons between the sizes of sets. So it concerns a logical system whose sentences are of the following forms: Allxareyand Somexarey, There are at least as manyxasy, and There are morexthany. Herexandyrange over subsets (not elements) of a giveninfiniteset. Moreover,xandymay appear complemented (i.e., as$\bar{x}$and$\bar{y}$), with the natural meaning. We formulate a logic for our language that is based on the classical syllogistic. The main result is a soundness/completeness theorem. (...) There are efficient algorithms for proof search and model construction. (shrink)

This book examines how, in a series of critical confrontations, Stirner rejected the efforts of his “Young Hegelian” contemporaries to recast Hegel as a revolutionary. For him, the various apocalyptic declarations of these “pious atheists” were only the expressions of adolescent dreams set upon the annihilation of real individuality.

The recent profusion of studies directed to uncovering the “Young Marx” has also provoked some renewed interest in his contemporary, Johann Caspar Schmidt, better known as Max Stirner. With a few exceptions, the most important being William Brazill’s The Young Hegelians, Stirner has been retained in his traditional role as Marx’s first critic, the harried “Sankt Max” of The German Ideology. This perspective, established firmly by Sidney Hook and continued by David McLellen, does cast light upon Marx’s development, but it (...) cannot be expected to do justice to Stirner, who is more than a mere anti-Marxist. (shrink)

I hope that the readers will forgive the length and personal character of these final words, but as this issue marks the end of my 19–year tenure as Editor of The Owl, I thought I could get away with it. This year also marks my retirement from university teaching. I’ve been at that for 37 years—with the last 32 years being spent at Villanova.

In August of 1978, the XVI World Congress of Philosophy convened in Düsseldorf. As the European Hegel societies were then unable to prepare a common program, it first appeared as if Hegel would be left unrepresented in this most important of philosophical gatherings. As this seemed not right, the Hegel Society of America took the initiative, at the last moment, to prepare a special section. The result proved, not unexpectedly, to be a great success. The special program featured two of (...) the finest Hegel scholars, Professors John N. Findlay and Errol E. Harris. The papers they delivered at that time, before a large and appreciative audience, were subsequently published in the Owl. (shrink)

In July of 1809, Samuel Thomas von Sömmerring constructed the first electric telegraph. We know that Hegel had carefully read Sömmerring’s work on human anatomy, and although we have no evidence that Hegel concerned himself with Sömmerring’s venture into electronic telegraphy, we cannot but think that he would have happily accepted new technical forms of communication — Hegel is not Heidegger. In any case, later in the century, the Hegelian Ernst Kapp did indeed attempt to grasp the complex relationship between (...) the advance of communications technology and the growth of global self-consciousness. Kapp’s pioneering work on Organprojektion is all but forgotten today, and given the rudimentary state of applied science at the time, and the dated romantic vision which inspired it, perhaps it appears not such a great loss. Still, he did try to cope philosophically with the new means of communication and to see in it something more than just a “practical” event. Well, the editor of the Owl, just as all editors, is prone to seeking out the pedestrian and practical side of matters, and to see what can be done with the latest in “electronic telegraphy.” If it so happens that such a practical effort supports Kapp’s thesis that communications technology and phenomenology are related, so much the better. (shrink)

At the entrance to Berlin’s Humboldt University where Hegel once taught, one of Marx’s slogans has been carved into the wall in large gilded letters: “Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; es kömmt darauf an, sie zu verändem.” Well, the world has certainly changed for the instructors and staff who once worked for the East German regime. For these former members of the Akademie, the days of wine and roses are over, with nothing remaining but a bad hangover. (...) What had been considered a pedagogical virtue, i.e., to appear as if convinced and to convince others that communist political propaganda was indeed philosophy, is now a discredited vice. For over four decades, the academic apparatchiks said it was the best of times, even if others were saying it was worst. Today, unsustained by bureaucratic fiat, the former staff and faculty find themselves confronted with a confusing new world - one which they had been assured had been consigned to the historical dustbin. Of course, without recourse to the formalities of a trial, it is almost impossible to determine the particular degree of complicity, if any, on the part of any individual related to the miserable doings of the Akademie. All of them claim to be innocent of any wrongdoing, of any action that would have inhibited the development of any would-be philosopher. Some, who even find friends among us, remain committed to the principle that philosophy has meaning only as a rationale for political correctness. Others simply claim to have had no role in past misdemeanors, having served as minor functionaries, a type found in any government. But despite these and other explanations, more than a few West German scholars have found it difficult to forgive and forget the prolonged degradation of Berlin’s famous university. (shrink)

Max Stirner (1806–1856) has been named as “The Last Hegelian,” which is usually taken to mean only that he was the final major figure among the so-called “Young Hegelians.” However, an argument can be made that he was not only the last in a historical sense, but that he was also the logical heir of Hegel’s philosophy. In short, Stirner concluded what Hegel had proposed as the “task” of philosophy: to supersede “fixed and determinate thoughts.” This lead Stirner to express (...) a distinctive form of egoism in which the indefinable individual, der Einziger, could neither be comprehended under any general idea, nor would need to act in accord with any ideals whatsoever. This set him in radical opposition to all of the other Young Hegelians, such as Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, or Bruno Bauer—all of whom sought to revise Hegel’s philosophy to accord with their own humanistic ideals. (shrink)

The topic of this conference, directed toward exploring the relationships between Hegel’s Naturphilosophie and his conception of spirit, drew a total of about 300 registrants, with about 140 papers being presented. Although sixteen countries were represented, well over half of the participants came from German universities. Next in the number of participants were those from Yugoslavia and Poland. There were five North Americans listed on the printed program, but only three attended: H.S. Harris, Leo Rauch, and this writer. Among the (...) welcome and familar faces in the audience were those of Howard P. Kainz, James Wilkinson, and Shlomo Avineri. Those of us who recalled the fine paper which Professor Avineri had presented at the 1986 Zürich conference were unhappy to learn that he had chosen not to present one at this time. (shrink)

The course of Western philosophy has been profoundly altered by the philosophy of Hegel. The first of those who set about the transforming and revisioning of the world according to Hegel's dialectical theory were called "The Young Hegelians." Today, the most recognized names among them are Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but in their own age each of the Young Hegelians shared an equal notoriety. Each in turn, from Strauss with his reduction of the historical jesus into a Messianic myth, (...) to Stirner with his uncompromising egoism, shocked every cultural convention of their age. The aftershocks of their unrestrained criticism have forever altered the topography of our own. The Young Hegelians retrieves some of the central writings of that troubling generation. (shrink)

The course of Western philosophy has been profoundly altered by the philosophy of Hegel. The first of those who set about the transforming and revisioning of the world according to Hegel's dialectical theory were called "The Young Hegelians." Today, the most recognized names among them are Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but in their own age each of the Young Hegelians shared an equal notoriety. Each in turn, from Strauss with his reduction of the historical jesus into a Messianic myth, (...) to Stirner with his uncompromising egoism, shocked every cultural convention of their age. The aftershocks of their unrestrained criticism have forever altered the topography of our own. The Young Hegelians retrieves some of the central writings of that troubling generation. (shrink)

A neglected Young Hegelian, Cieszkowski published prolifically in economics and philosophy, but the work most influential on the Hegelians was his Prolegomena Zur Historiosophie . Rejecting the conservative interpretation of Hegel, it denied that the end of history had been reached, celebrated the will as transcending thought, and anticipated a future in which being and thinking would find their syntheses in praxis. At once a critique of Hegel and a development of Hegelianism, his work is most notable for its millennial (...) optimism. (shrink)

Although Hegel cautioned against any declarations about what the future should be, this does not preclude making a few observations about what it might be; and insofar as The Owl will soon have a new Editor, it now seems appropriate to hazard an opinion as to what The Owl might become.

From its first appearance in 1844, Max Stirner’s major work, Der Einzige und sein Eigentum ,[1] has produced little agreement among its many interpreters. The very first of these interpreters was Friedrich Engels, who suggested that Stirner’s doctrines would be quite compatible with Benthamite utilitarianism, which he then admired, and even saw in these doctrines the potential of benefiting communism.[2] Marx, in short order, corrected this optimistic deviation, and then—with a surely repentant Engels—set forth the orthodox gospel for all future (...) generations of communists: Stirner, or “Sankt Max,” was but the speculative spokesman for the petty bourgeois, a decadent Hegelian boasting over the unrestraint of his self inflated ego.[3] Sidney Hook echoed Marx when he condemned Stirner’s work as but the “social defense mechanism of a petty bourgeois soul.”[4] Others, unsatisfied with this “petty” status, elevate him to that of the Grand Bourgeois, or Fascist.[5] Still others, taking an opposite stance, see in Stirner the most articulate defender of individual liberty.[6] In between, he has been called a nihilist, an anarchist, an existentialist, a solipsist, an anti Benthamite, an intemperate capitalist, or—as we might now suspect—an anti capitalist.[7] At least two commentators, lost in the confusion, have managed to escape the need to classify Stirner within the ongoing political and ethical categories and simply declare him to be insane.[8] In short, the list of radically diverse interpretations.. (shrink)

In defining the Wise Man, the Man of absolute Knowledge, as perfectly self‐conscious – i. e., omniscient, at least potentially – Hegel nevertheless had the unheard‐of audacity to assert that he realized Wisdom in his own person.

Since its foundation in 1969, The Hegel Society of America has sponsored an ongoing series of biennial conferences which have provided a regular forum for some of the finest displays of scholarship ever directed toward the explication and development of Hegelianism. The fourteen essays in this distinguished collection have been carefully selected from these biennial conferences. Each essay has been chosen for its profound scholarship, philosophical acumen, and literary excellence. All of the authors have attained international recognition for their studies (...) of Hegel, with almost half having been, at one time or another, elected to the Presidency of the Hegel Society. (shrink)